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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent professionals trained in first-to-file countries wonder
why the novelty and priority provisions set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 are complex and difficult to understand because the novelty
and priority provisions of first-to-file countries are short and
simple. Only after studying the historical backgrounds of each
provision, and the policy considerations related to the terms used
in those provisions, can they understand the complex structure of
defining prior art and the unique interpretation given to the
terms. However, the more familiar they become with U.S. case
law and the policies emphasized by U.S. judges, the more they
question whether the United States actually follows the first-to-
invent system, which U.S. patent scholars and professionals
claim to follow.1 The policies U.S. judges emphasize are similar to
the policies emphasized by first-to-file patent systems.
Furthermore, the examination practice followed by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is very similar to
that of patent offices in first-to-file countries.2
Nevertheless, many U.S. commentators emphasize a well-
established perception that the first-to-invent principle favors
small inventors, and therefore argue against adopting a first-to-
file system like those adopted by most other countries.3 The
adherence by the United States to the first-to-invent principle
1. Many commentators compare the U.S. first-to-invent system with the first-to-
file systems, presuming that they are very different. See, e.g., Stephanie Gore, Comment,
"Eureka! But I Filed Too Late...": The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent
System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCI. ROUNDTABLE 293, 305-09 (1993) (comparing and
contrasting the first-to-invent and first-to-file systems in terms of the harms and benefits
of each as defined from a natural rights baseline).
2. Refer to Part II.B infra.
3. See, e.g., Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779, 782-89, 792-93 (1991).
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creates a significant obstacle to the creation of a global patent
system.4 The United States was criticized by its trading partners,
principally Europe and Japan, when it suddenly withdrew from
international negotiations to execute the Patent Law Treaty5 that
would have led the United States to give up its first-to-invent
system.6 This strong resistance against the adoption of the first-
to-file principle is motivated by the belief that a first-to-invent
system favors small inventors.
On its face, the § 102 novelty and priority provisions under
the U.S. first-to-invent policy are very different from novelty and
priority provisions under the first-to-file principle. The first
provision defining novelty in § 102(a) sets forth a determination
of novelty as of the invention date, and § 102(g) provides a rule
that determines priority based on the date of first invention
rather than the date of the first application." However, are all
these differences in fact real? Are these differences so
fundamental and thus irreconcilable with concepts of novelty and
priority under the first-to-file principle?
This Article first examines the novelty and priority
provisions of first-to-file countries, and then compares them with
U.S. counterparts to identify major differences and determine
why these differences result.9 The Article discusses the origins of
the complex structure adopted by § 102 to define prior art and
the difficult interpretation given to terms used in the novelty
definition. 10 This Article then reviews the USPTO's practice of the
novelty examination and the priority determination in
interference proceedings.11 This review confirms the first-to-file
patent professional's perception that the United States, in fact,
follows the first-to-file principle, although it also provides an
exception to first-to-invent. Further, this Article will reveal that
4. Kim Taylor, Note, Patent Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: "The
First to File" Debate Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 521, 544-45 (1994) (concluding that
without concessions of equal magnitude from first-to-file countries, the United States is
unlikely to sacrifice its first-to-file system).
5. Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo038en.htm (last visited July 25, 2002).
6. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 525-26 (noting that the decision by the United
States to put patent harmonization treaty negotiations indefinitely "on hold" in 1994 was
due in substantial part to an unwillingness to dispose of its first-to-invent system in favor
of a first-to-file system).
7. See Conley, supra note 3, at 782-88, 792 (arguing that small inventors would be
harmed by a first-to-file system because they would have to file their invention before
they have had the chance to fully develop it).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); id. § 102(g).
9. Refer to notes Part II.A infra.
10. Refer to notes Part II.B infra.
11. Refer to notes Part II.C infra.
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labeling U.S. novelty and priority rules as a first-to-invent
approach not only is misleading, but the well-established
perception of favoring small inventors does not reflect the reality
of USPTO practice. 2
To protect U.S. inventors from being misled by false
perception and labeling and to reflect the USPTO's examination
and interference practices and thus make clear the first-to-file
principle the USPTO follows, this Article proposes a revision of
§ 102 by an ad hoc exception showing an invention date with
corroborative evidence. 3 Modeling the simple structure used to
define novelty and priority in first-to-file countries, the revised
§ 102 this Article proposes is simple and easily understood by
inventors without any knowledge of U.S. case law. To simplify
the examination practice further, this Article concludes with a
proposal to limit the amount of time and the type of applicants
who can establish priority. 4
II. REVIEW OF NOVELTY AND PRIORITY PROVISIONS
A. The Simple Structure of First-to-File Novelty and Priority
1. Novelty. Novelty provisions of major first-to-file
countries, namely those of the European Patent Convention
(EPC) 5 and Japanese Patent Law (JPL),16 have simple and short
definitions of prior art; any form of disclosure gives rise to the
prior art, regardless of the actor of such disclosure. For example,
the EPC provides the following definition of novelty:
(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not
form part of the state of the art.
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral
12. Refer to notes 187-202 infra and accompanying text.
13. Refer to Part III.A infra.
14. Refer to Part III.B infra (providing examples of modest changes that would limit
the scope of the first-to-invent exception without moving completely to a first-to-file
system).
15. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 54, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255, 272 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (entered into force on Oct. 7,
1977). The Convention represents the substantive patent law for seven European nations:
Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, and
Belgium. Id. at n. 1.
16. TOKKYO Ho [Japanese Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29-30
[hereinafter Japanese Patent Law].
624 [39:621
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description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of
filing of the European patent application.
17
The novelty definition of JPL is similar to the EPC
definition, except the Japanese definition also lists items that
constitute the prior art, including information available via the
Internet." Unlike the U.S. provision, neither the European nor
Japanese provisions distinguish the definition of prior art by
actors and thus do not have separate provisions for the inventor's
and others' actions. Terms used to define the prior art are given
ordinary meaning. The simple, key concept to make information
give rise to prior art is public accessibility. 9 Under the European
and Japanese novelty approaches, any information made publicly
available in any form of publication anywhere in the world, as of
the date of application, constitutes prior art.2° In other words,
European and Japanese novelty does not discriminate between
disclosures by the form or the place of disclosure.
Although technically not available as of the application date
of the subject matter under examination, first-to-file countries
also view subject matter described in an application pending in
their own patent office as prior art, provided that the application
is later published through an eighteen-month publication,
thereby becoming publicly available.2' This distinction is required
17. European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54, at 272.
18. Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29 reads:
(1) Any person who has made an invention which is industrially applicable may
obtain a patent therefor, except in the case of the following inventions:
(i) inventions which were publicly known in Japan or elsewhere prior to the
filing of the patent application;
(ii) inventions which were publicly worked in Japan or elsewhere prior to
the filing of the patent application;
(iii) inventions which were described in a distributed publication or made
available to the public through electric telecommunication lines in Japan or
elsewhere prior to the filing of the patent application.
19. ROMUALD SINGER & MARGARETE SINGER, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION
221 (Ralph Lunzer trans., Sweet & Maxwell rev. ed. 1995) (1989) (noting that, when the
situation of simultaneous inventors arises, the principle that the right to patent goes to
the first to file is limited to the extent that the earlier application must be published).
20. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54, at 272; Japanese
Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29(1)(iii).
21. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 19, at 165. The European Patent Convention
reads:
(3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as filed, of which
the dates of filing are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and which
were published under Article 93 on or after that date, shall be considered as
comprised in the state of the art.
(4) Paragraph 3 shall be applied only in so far as a Contracting State designated
in respect of the later application, was also designated in respect of the earlier
application as published.
European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54(3)-(4), at 272.
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because the subject matter will soon become publicly available, at
least to the patent office. Both the EPC and JPL adopted the
"whole contents" approach, making the whole contents of
European and Japanese applications the prior art as of the filing
date.22 With respect to applications claiming priority right under
the Paris Convention, the whole contents of applications become
the prior art as of the priority date.28
As an exception to this simple novelty principle, most first-
to-file countries provide a grace period provision.24  One
commentator from a first-to-file country defines grace period as a
specific period of time prior to the filing of a patent application by
the inventor or his or her successor in title, during which time
disclosures of an invention do not forfeit a right to patent the
invention.25 Under the first-to-file system, grace period provisions
are provided as an exception to the principle that novelty is
determined as of the application date. Because grace periods are
an exception and not a rule, conditions that allow one to take
advantage of the grace period are very restrictive. Among those
countries that provide a grace period, the majority, 57%, adopted
a six-month grace period; only 30% adopted a one-year grace
period.26 To limit the scope of subject matter that can take
advantage of the exception, the vast majority of countries have
adopted a disclosure-specific grace period, in which only certain
categories of disclosure are qualified to take advantage of a grace
period.27 The most common disclosure-qualified categories
include: experimental use, disclosure by an applicant, disclosure
by a third party, abuse of right, display at an international
exhibition, and presentation at a scientific meeting.28 Further,
applicants cannot take advantage of the system unless they
22. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 19, at 165 (stating that under the European
Patent Convention, earlier patent applications constitute prior art even if they do not
result in the grant of a patent, as long as the application is published).
23. Id. (indicating that, according to the European Patent Convention "whole
content approach," the filing date of the first application is the priority date).
24. According to the survey conducted by AIPPI Japan Group, 87% of 121 national
and regional patent systems provide for some type of grace period system. Japanese
Group of AIPPI, A Study of Grace Period and Other Conditions of Patentability in
National and Regional Patent Systems (summary report), at 1 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter
AIPPI Study].
25. Joseph Straus, Grace Period and the European and International Patent Law:
Analysis of Key Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects, 20 IIC STUDIES: STUDIES IN INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 3 (Gerhard Schricker ed., 2001).
26. AIPPI Study, supra note 24, at 2.
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Id. at 2.
626 [39:621
2002] RETHINKING NOVELTY AND PRIORITY 627
invoke the grace period at the date of application and submit
evidence of the claimed subject matter.29
One extreme example of the first-to-file grace period is the
system under the EPC. The scope of disclosure that can take
advantage of the EPC grace period is very limited, and applicants
must meet procedural requirements to invoke the system." In
contrast, the Japanese grace period is more general than that of
the European system and includes a broad range of inventors'
activities to take advantage of the system.3 Under the Japanese
29. E.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 55, at 272-73 (mandating
that a supporting certificate must be filed if the inventor is to take advantage of the grace
period after disclosure at an official exhibition); Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art.
30(4) (requiring any person seeking an exception for disclosure to file documentation with
the patent office commissioner).
30. The EPC provides two categories of disclosures that can take advantage of the
grace period:
(1) For the application of Article 54 a disclosure of the invention shall not be
taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the
filing of the European patent application and if it was due to, or in consequence
of:
(a) an evident abuse in relation to the applicant or his legal predecessor, or
(b) the fact that the applicant or his legal predecessor has displayed the
invention at an official, or officially recognised, international exhibition
falling within the terms of the Convention on international exhibitions
signed at Paris on 22 November 1928 and last revised on 30 November
1972.
(2) In the case of paragraph 1(b), paragraph 1 shall apply only if the applicant
states, when filing the European patent application, that the invention has been
so displayed and files a supporting certificate within the period and under the
conditions laid down in the Implementing Regulations.
European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 55, at 272-73.
31. The JPL provides:
(1) In the case of an invention which has fallen under any of the paragraphs of
Section 29(1) by reason of the fact that the person having the right to obtain a
patent has conducted an experiment, has made a presentation in a printed
publication, has made a presentation through electric telecommunication lines,
or has made a presentation in writing at a study meeting held by a scientific
body designated by the Commissioner of the Patent Office, such invention shall
be deemed not [to] have fallen under any of the paragraphs of Section 29(1) for
the purposes of Section 29(1) and (2) to the invention claimed in the patent
application which has been filed by such person within six months from the date
on which the invention first fell under those paragraphs.
(2) In the case of an invention which has fallen under any of the paragraphs of
Section 29(1) against the will of the person having the right to obtain a patent,
the preceding subsection shall also apply for the purposes of Section 29(1) and
(2) to the invention claimed in the patent application which has been filed by
such person within six months from the date on which the invention first fell
under any of those paragraphs.
(3) In the case of an invention which has fallen under any of the paragraphs of
Section 29(1) by reason of the fact that the person having the right to obtain a
patent has exhibited the invention at an exhibition held by the Government or
by any local public entity (hereinafter referred to as the "Government, etc.") or
at one which is not held by the Government, etc. but is designated by the
628 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [39:621
system, an applicant can take advantage of the grace period not
only with subject matter that is identical to the subject matter
disclosed prior to the date of application, but also obvious subject
matter.1
2
2. Priority. The priority provisions of major first-to-file
countries are predicated on a simple rule: a patent should be
granted to the first applicant. For example, EPC Article 60,
Paragraph 2 provides:
If two or more persons have made an invention
independently of each other, the right to the European
patent shall belong to the person whose European patent
application has the earliest date of filing; however, this
provision shall apply only if this first application has been
published under Article 93 and shall only have effect in
respect of the Contracting States designated in that
application as published.33
Because priority is granted based on the date an applicant files
an application to be examined by the European Patent Office
(EPO),34 a procedure to decide the priority among more than one
Commissioner of the Patent Office, or at an international exhibition held in the
territory of a country party to the Paris Convention or of a Member of the World
Trade Organization by its government, etc. or by a person authorized thereby, or
at an international exhibition held in the territory of a country not party to the
Paris Convention nor a member of the World Trade Organization by its
government, etc. or by a person authorized thereby where such exhibition has
been designated by the Commissioner of the Patent Office, Subsection (1) shall
also apply for the purposes of Section 29(i) and (2) to the invention claimed in
the patent application which has been filed by such person within six months
from the date on which the invention first fell under those paragraphs.
(4) Any person who desires the application of Subsection (1) or the preceding
subsection shall submit a written statement to that effect to the Commissioner
of the Patent Office simultaneously with the patent application and within 30
days of the filing of the patent application, he shall also submit to the
Commissioner of the Patent Office a document proving that the invention that
has fallen under any of the paragraphs of Section 29(1) is the invention for
which the provision of Subsection (1) or the preceding subsection may be
applicable.
Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 30.
32. Id. (making the grace period applicable to both types of subject matter).
33. European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 60(2), at 273. The JPL
similarly provides:
(1) Where two or more patent applications relating to the same invention are
filed on different dates, only the first applicant may obtain a patent for the
invention.
Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 39(1).
34. The European Patent Office was established under Article 4 of the Convention
on the Grant of European Patents. European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 4, at
259. News, updates, and general information concerning the European Patent Office can
be found at http://www.european-patent-office.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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application is unnecessary as long as the dates are clear. When
more than two applicants file applications for the same invention
on the same date, the EPO gives patents to both applicants."5
The Japanese rule is very similar to the European rule,
except in the manner that the Japanese rule handles more than
one application with the same application date."6 The JPL
requires applicants who filed for the same invention on the same
date to negotiate for an agreement to identify one applicant who
will obtain the patent.37 If applicants cannot reach an agreement,
the Japan Patent Office (JPO)5 refuses to give a patent to either
party.39 This practice avoids an expensive proceeding to award
the priority among applicants who filed their applications on the
same day.
These rules also apply to the determination of priority
during the grace period. Under the grace period provisions of
first-to-file countries, if a third party files prior to the date of
application by the inventor who disclosed the same invention
during the grace period, the inventor's application is rejected for
being the second to file.4" If the third party's date of application is
after the inventor's date of disclosure, the disclosure destroys the
novelty of the third-party application, and thus a patent is
granted to neither party.41
B. Complex and Confusing: U.S. First-to-Invent Novelty and
Priority
In contrast to the European and Japanese systems, the
novelty and priority provisions under 35 U.S.C. § 102 adopt a
complex structure to define the prior art and use confusing terms
without giving a clear definition to them. Courts give terms used
to define the prior art an interpretation that is vastly different
from their ordinary meanings. As a result, these terms are very
35. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 19, at 221 (discussing how the EPC resolves
conflicts between two people that have independently invented the same subject matter at
issue).
36. Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 39(1) (providing that "[w]here two or
more patent applications relating to the same invention are filed on different dates, only
the first applicant may obtain a patent for the invention").
37. Id. art. 39(4).
38. Information about the JPO is available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/homee.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
39. Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 39(2).
40. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 60(2), at 273;
Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29bis.
41. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54(2), at 272;
Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29.
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difficult for inventors to understand without extensive knowledge
of U.S. case law clarifying the meaning of terms used in § 102.
1. Novelty.
a. § 102(a) and (b). The U.S. novelty provisions, § 102(a)
and (b), determine the novelty of the invention as of the date of
invention, thereby making the first-to-invent novelty rule clear."
The approach adopted by § 102(a) and (b) is very different from
the first-to-file approach of the EPC and JPL, both of which
determine the novelty of invention as of the filing date."
However, like the novelty definition of first-to-file countries,
§ 102(b) defines the prior art as of the date one year prior to the
date of application.44 The substance of the condition provided in
§ 102(b) removing pre-filing disclosures during a specific period,
one year from the filing date, seems to fit the definition of the
grace period. 5 However, the significance of a grace period is very
different between the U.S. first-to-invent system and the first-to-
file systems. Under a true first-to-invent rule, a grace period is
not an exception, but a principle, because the novelty is
determined as of the date of invention.4 6 A true first-to-invent
rule requires that a patent office grant a patent on subject matter
that was published and has become old prior to the date of
application, as long as the subject matter is new and non-obvious
as of the invention date. 7 Under such a rule, the subject matter's
condition as of the date of filing has nothing to do with its
patentability. However, the U.S. patent system does not follow
the true first-to-invent rule because it has exceptions to the
rule-statutory bars-that prevent inventors from obtaining a
patent after the expiration of a grace period once inventors
42. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
43. E.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54(2), at 272; Japanese
Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29(1).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
45. For the definition of grace period, see Straus, supra note 25, at 3. U.S. legal
scholars also view the similarity between § 102(b) and first-to-file novelty provisions. See
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 206 (1998)
(recognizing that § 102(b) statutory bars appear similar to the novelty provisions inherent
in first-to-file systems).
46. Canadian patent law long followed this true type of first-to-invent rule until it
was revised to adopt a first-to-file rule. Christiana v. Rice, [1931] A.C. 770, 777-79, 782-
83 (appeal taken from Can.) (interpreting the Canadian Patent Act of 1923 to hold that
the right to a Canadian patent goes to the first inventor regardless of where that
invention occurred, even if the first inventor had not made his invention accessible to the
public in any way). See generally ADELMAN, supra note 45, at 318 (explaining the
evolution of Canadian patent law).
47. See Christiana, [1931] A.C. at 776 (citing the Canadian Patent Act of 1923,
which outlined how Canada, a true first-to-invent country, granted patents).
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engage in one of the activities listed in § 102(b), (c), or (d).4" Thus,
under the current U.S. first-to-invent rule, granting a patent on
subject matter that is disclosed prior to the date of application is
a principle; a statutory bar that prevents the patent office from
granting a patent on subject matter that is disclosed prior to the
grace period is an exception.
As a result, the conditions for taking advantage of the grace
period under § 102(b) are much more generous than the
conditions under the first-to-file principle. Where § 102 is
concerned, there is no restriction on the type of disclosures that
can take advantage of the grace period and that are
automatically removed from the prior art for examination of both
novelty and non-obviousness.49 Further, the grace period is one
year from the actual U.S. filing date,"° instead of the six-month
period adopted by the majority of first-to-file countries.
Compared with the novelty provisions of first-to-file
countries, such as the EPC and JPL, 35 U.S.C. § 102 is much
more complex and difficult to understand. This complexity
results from the types of disclosures listed in both § 102(a) and
(b), but that overlap each other. For example, both § 102(a) and
(b) list subject matter that may be patented and described in a
printed publication. 1 With respect to these disclosures, only the
actor distinguishes § 102(a) from § 102(b).52 If subject matter is
patented or described in a printed publication more than one
year prior to a third party's date of invention for the same subject
matter, an examiner can cite both § 102(a) and (b) to reject the
third party's claim for the subject matter. 3 Because the
substance of the conditions for § 102(b) is essentially the same as
first-to-file novelty in excluding inventors' activities during the
grace period, patent professionals wonder why the U.S. patent
statute avoids defining the prior art by actors separately, which
would remove redundant items of disclosure from the prior art
definition.54 Only after reading early court decisions and finding
out the historical reason for separating the prior art definition by
48. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1829) (clarifying the inventor's
rights by positing the principle that an inventor loses the right to a patent if he puts his
invention into public use before filing a patent application). Although the concept of a
grace period did not yet exist in American patent law at the time of Pennock, the Court
established that, despite the emphasis on the first-to-invent principle, the first inventor's
rights are not without boundary. Id. at 22-24.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
50. Id.





actors of disclosure can they understand these complex
provisions.
The origin of separate provisions by actors can be found in
the 1829 Pennock case.55 In Pennock, a major flaw of a true first-
to-invent system was highlighted when the first inventor publicly
used his invention and filed an application only after a
competitor started to sell the invention.56 In interpreting the
novelty provision of the 1793 Patent Act, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in a decision authored by Justice Story, excluded
inventors from the category of persons who knew or used the
invention prior to the date of invention.57 With respect to acts of
inventors, reflecting the policy of promoting an early disclosure
through patent application, the Court held that inventors were
prevented from commercial exploitation of their inventions prior
to the date of application to avoid an extension of a statutorily
limited patent term.58 Later, § 102(b) was added to codify this
holding regarding an inventors' activity.59 Following the rationale
adopted by Justice Story that the policy of early disclosure only
relates to acts of inventors, the U.S. novelty rule provides novelty
for inventors and for third parties separately.
Another confusing aspect regarding the definition of the
prior art under § 102(a) and (b) is an unclear distinction among
the listed subject matter. Although § 102(a) and (b) list "being
patented" and "described in a printed publication" separately,
both subject matters become the prior art when the subject is
made available to the public even in a minimal way.6 ° Even
55. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829).
56. Id. at 7-8.
57. Id. at 18-20.
58. Id. at 6-8.
59. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02[11[b], at 6-10 to 6-11 (2002)
[hereinafter CHISUM ON PATENTS].
60. For an analysis of "being patented," see Dulplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 826, 832-33 (D.S.C. 1973), affd, 487 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1973), which explains
the difference between patents issued on the date the patent is granted as opposed to the
date of publication. See also 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 3.06[4], at 3-111
(noting the importance of foreign patent filing dates when considering novelty under
§ 102(a), (b), and (d): in the United States the date of patenting is the date the patent is
(1) issued to the patentee, (2) available to the public, (3) fully published, (4) effective in
terms of the exclusive rights conferred, and (5) effective in terms of the statutory period of
the monopoly, while in many foreign patent regimes several of these significant events
may occur on different dates). For an analysis of "described in a printed publication," see
In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986), which held that a doctoral thesis was
prior art because it was a printed publication that was available to the public even though
the thesis was in a single catalogue index in a single library. See also 1 CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 59, § 3.04[2], at 3-52 to 3-63 (discussing what constitutes a printed
publication and to what extent it must be accessible to the public to satisfy statutory
bars).
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though courts limit the scope of what is patented to claimed
subject matter, and they try to distinguish it from beingdescibe in prnted • • 61
described in a printed publication, as long as the content of a
patent is made available to the public, both claimed and
unclaimed subject matter become the prior art under § 102(a)
and (b) as a printed publication. Further, the narrow view
adopted by the majority of U.S. courts is criticized for failing to
find a sound justification for distinguishing claimed and
unclaimed subject matter in a single document.62 Therefore, first-
to-file patent professionals wonder why the U.S. novelty
provision adopts a simple definition tied to public accessibility,
instead of listing redundant subject matter definitions.
Moreover, a variety of foreign patents, which are vastly
different from U.S. patents, present serious problems." Parties
dispute whether foreign patents, whose term and scope of
exclusive right are not as extensive as those of U.S. patents, fall
within the meaning of "being patented" in § 102(a) and (b).64
Parties also dispute the date that a foreign patent has become
"patented" because the content of a foreign patent does not
necessarily become available to the public on the same day that
an exclusive right is vested.65
61. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557, 566 (D. Md.
1955), affd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956) (concluding that information that appears in
specifications, but is not actually claimed in the patent, does not constitute prior art); 1
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 3.06[3], at 3-109 to 3-110 (elucidating that the
Carter rule is prevailing law despite its unsoundness as a matter of policy).
62. 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 3.06[3], at 3-110 (asserting that treating
some disclosures in a single document, but not others, is unsound when the disclosures
are germane to the same subject).
63. Id. § 3.06, at 3-100 to 3-114.
64. See, e.g., In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
a German "Geschmacksmuster," or design registration, constitutes a patent for § 102
purposes); Atlas Glass Co. v. Simonds Mfg. Co., 102 F. 643, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1900)
(concluding that a Danish "eneret," which means "monopoly," constitutes a patent within
the statutory language); Reeves Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 282 F. Supp. 118,
134-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that a
"Gebrauchsmuster" (utility patent) constitutes a patent for § 102 purposes).
65. See In re Monks, 588 F.2d 308, 308-10 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (addressing whether a
British patent takes effect "on the date the complete specification is published or on the
date when the patent is sealed"); In re Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 322-25 (C.C.P.A. 1958)
(holding that a Belgium patent issued on March 31, 1950, but kept secret, did not become
a patent until it became available to the public on July 1, 1950); Trico Prods. Corp. v.
Delman Corp., 180 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1950) (resolving a dispute over the date of an
Italian patent); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 826, 829-31 (D.S.C.
1973), affd, 487 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1973) (scrutinizing a French patent whose U.S.
application was filed after the French delivery date but prior to its publication); Ex parte
Fujii, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1073, 1074-75, 1989 WL 274403 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1989)
(rejecting a patent application on grounds that the date of an unexamined laid-open
publication does not qualify for the benefit of a "first filed" application under 35 U.S.C.
§ 119).
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Literally interpreted, subject matter "being known or used"
in § 102(a) and subject matter in "public use or on sale" in
§ 102(b) seem to overlap each other. Although the language of
§ 102(a) and (b) uses distinct terms, courts interpret the terms
"being known or used" and "public use or on sale" in the same
way by requiring public access to the subject matter information
when an act of a third party is concerned." However, when the
terms are interpreted with respect to an act of an inventor,
courts distinguish "being known or used" from "public use" or "on
sale" because they do not require public access to give rise to
"public use or on sale." 7
Even worse, although the language of § 102(b) does not
define an "actor," courts apply this peculiar interpretation of
"public use or on sale," including confidential use, only with
respect to the acts of inventors. 8 One can understand this
distinction only when one investigates U.S. case law and finds
that this interpretation is included to prevent inventors from
extending the limited patent term by secretly exploiting their
inventions.69 Because third party activities have nothing to do
with the policy of encouraging inventors to disclose early, courts
give ordinary meaning to "public use or on sale" and require
public accessibility and knowledge."
Additionally, U.S. courts introduced another difficulty in
interpreting "public use" by developing the experimental-use
exception doctrine. The doctrine originates from the 1877 City of
Elizabeth Supreme Court decision in which the Court found no
66. For an interpretation of "being known or used," see Conn. Valley Enters., Inc. v.
United States, 348 F.2d 949, 951-52 (Ct. Cl. 1965), which recognized that "[t]he prior
knowledge or use in order to negative novelty must also be accessible to the public." For
an interpretation of "public use or on sale," see W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721
F.2d 1540, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which refused to find "public use" with respect to
subject matter that a third party used secretly.
67. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1881) (concluding that a public
use occurred when an inventor gave several completed products to a friend to use for more
than two years before applying for a patent on the product); Metallizing Eng'g Co. v.
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1946) (positing that
public use can result "regardless of how little the public may have learned about the
invention").
68. See Metallizing Engineering, 153 F.2d at 520 (reciting that a condition of an
inventor's right to a patent is "that he shall not exploit his discovery after it is ready for
patenting" lest he forfeit his right to a patent).
69. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1829) (recognizing that allowing an
inventor to publicly exploit an invention and refrain from seeking patent protection until
faced with competition contravenes the constitutionally-prescribed policy of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts).
70. See W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1549-50 (conceding that secret third party's
commercialization of a process without public disclosure does not bar a patent on that
process).
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public use when the inventor installed his street pavement on the
public road to check the durability of the pavement.7' When U.S.
courts find a public use of an invention by the inventor to be
experimental, such public use does not fall under the meaning of
"public use" in § 102(b).7' However, nothing in the patent statute
mentions exclusion of public experimentation.73 Thus, only those
71. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-35 (1877)
(finding a six-year use prior to the filing of a patent to be experimental).
72. See 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.02[7], at 6-123 to 6-124 (noting
"that activity that would otherwise constitute the placing of an invention in 'public use' or
'on sale' will not trigger the [§] 102(b) statutory bar if the use or sale was incidental to
experimentation"); Eric M. Lee, Public Use and On Sale Issues Arising from Clinical
Testing of Medical Devices, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 364, 367-77 (1993)
(examining whether clinical testing of a medical device results in a public use or on sale
bar); Herbert H. Mintz & Richard B. Racine, Anticipation and Obviousness in the Federal
Circuit, 13 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 195, 198-203 (1985) (reviewing the Federal
Circuit's analysis of § 102 and recognizing the "substantial development" in federal case
law involving the on sale and public use bars); Charles F. Pigott, Jr., The Concepts of
Public Use and Sale, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 399, 411-26 (1967) (summarizing the courts'
application or refusal to apply the experimental use exception); William C. Rooklidge &
Matthew F. Weil, The Application of Experimental Use to Design Patents: A Square Peg in
a Round Hole, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 921, 921-22 (1995) (criticizing the
Federal Circuit's approach to the experimental use exception as negating the public use
and on sale bars to patentability); William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffmann, III,
Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the 'On Sale' and 'Public Use' Bars to
Patentability, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5-49 (1988) (chronicling the genesis and
development of the on sale and public use bars and proposing a simple test for each bar
that would incorporate the bars' underlying policies and "the analytical framework of the
Supreme Court's early cases"); Gerald T. Welch, Patent Law's Ephemeral Experimental
Use Doctrine: Judicial Lip Service to a Judicial Misnomer or the Experimental Stage
Doctrine, 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 865, 866-92 (1980) (critiquing the courts' application of the
experimental use doctrine, and asserting that the courts actually employ a
reasonableness standard in tandem with the doctrine, effectively creating an
'experimental stage doctrine"); Charles C. Wells & Wayland H. Riggins, Public Use and
Sale as a Bar to Obtaining a Patent and Its Application to Government Activities, 18 AM.
U. L. REV. 43, 51-57 (1968) (analyzing the public use bar and the experimental use
exception as they apply to research and developmental projects of the federal
government); Roger M. Fitz-Gerald, Comment, Experimentation and Public Use of
Inventions-An Analysis of Appellate Anemia, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 585, 585-89 (1960)
(advancing that the two inconsistent theories underlying the experimental use doctrine-
the "exclusion theory" and the "exception theory"-have been applied without distinction
by the appellate courts, resulting in "an improper adjustment of the complementary goals
of development and disclosure"); Note, The Public Use Bar to Patentability: Two New
Approaches to the Experimental Use Exception, 52 MINN. L. REV. 851, 852-71 (1968)
(canvassing the problems faced by the courts in applying the experimental use exception);
Jay David Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents After Market Testing: A New and
Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 373-95 (1985) (examining
the treatment of market testing under the experimental use doctrine and advocating a
more liberal application of the doctrine in the case of market testing); John C. Vassil,
Note, Public Use: The Inventor's Dilemma, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 297, 298-311 (1958)
(illustrating the courts' inability to distinguish between experimental use and public use
and commenting on the difficulties faced by inventors when attempting to take advantage
of the experimental use exception).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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who are familiar with U.S. case law understand that the term
"public use" includes a secret use but excludes public
experimental use when an inventor's act is concerned.
These doctrines relating to the interpretation of "public use
or on sale" introduce uncertainty to the validity of U.S. patents.
First, inclusion of secret commercial use within the meaning of
"public use or on sale" introduces a significant uncertainty in
U.S. patent validity. Although the duty of disclosure requires
patentees to disclose such use,"4 it is impossible for the patent
office or competitors to show that the inventor in fact used the
invention more than one year from the date of application if the
inventor fails to disclose the use. Such use is only revealed
through discovery when the inventor tries to enforce his patent
despite his violation of the duty to disclose.
Uncertainty in patent validity also results from a difficulty
in applying the doctrines. To prevent inventors from extending
the grace period by drafting a claim slightly different from
subject matter that was in "public use or on sale," U.S. courts
apply a different and relaxed identity standard for the claimed
invention and the disclosed subject matter under § 102(b).75
However, there are still some courts that use the same standard
used for § 102(a) novelty, which requires all elements of the claim
to be in the prior art. 6
Another difficulty results from a common-sense requirement
that an invention must be complete to make an offer to sell.77
However, U.S. courts struggle to clarify the degree of an
invention's completeness that is required in order to be defined
as commercial activity with respect to the invention that will give
rise to "on sale."7 Both courts and parties are confused by the
74. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000).
75. See, e.g., Tool Research & Eng'g Corp. v. Honcor Corp., 367 F.2d 449, 454 (9th
Cir. 1966). For a general discussion of prior art, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Ever
Evolving Meaning of Prior Art (Part 6), 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 658, 659-78 (1983) and
Alton D. Rollins, Comment, Loss of Right as "Prior Art," 63 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 663, 665-
66 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Delong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1141-43 (3d Cir.
1980).
77. This requirement is known as the "on hand" doctrine. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS,
supra note 59, § 6.02[6] [a], at 6-71 to 6-75.
78. For a discussion of U.S. courts' attempts to clarify the on sale bar doctrine, see
Vincent J. Allen, Comment, The On Sale Bar: When Will Inventors Receive Some
Guidance?, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 125, 131-46 (1999) (pulling together the various methods
used by the courts in applying the on sale bar); Jonathan Pavlovcak, Note, The Clock
Starts Running Before Substantial Completion-Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 17 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 177, 179-82 (1999) (discussing the Pfaff ruling); Note, Supreme
Court Finds Invention Was "On Sale" Before It Was Made, 11 SOFTwARE L. BULL. 236
(1998) (reporting on the Supreme Court's ruling in Pfaff, which declared an inventor's
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concepts used to determine the completion of invention, which
are similar to the concepts used for interference--conception and
reduction to practice-and the concepts used for the on sale
bar-an invention on hand for sale--although interference
practice and the on sale bar relate to different policies.79 Although
the Supreme Court announced a "ready for patenting" standard
to replace the Federal Circuit's "substantial completion"
standard, supposedly to, bring more certainty,80 parties still
dispute the definition of "ready for patenting" in relation to
conception and reduction to practice.8'
Another factor that causes difficulty in the application of the
doctrines associated with "public use or on sale" is the
requirement of commercial nature in inventors' acts.82 To give
rise to "on sale," courts only require an offer to sell and not an
acceptance or delivery.8" However, even if the subject matter was
delivered to others, courts may find an offer to be a sham.84 The
same degree of difficulty exists in establishing a standard to
determine "experimental use." 5
patent to be invalid due to a violation of the on sale bar even though the disputed "sale"
occurred before the invention was physically constructed); Daniel J. Whitman, Note, The
"On-Sale" Bar to Patentability: Actual Reduction to Practice Not Required in Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics, Inc., 32 AKRON L. REV. 397, 410-19 (1999) (surveying the background of the
on sale bar doctrine and addressing the implications of the Pfaff decision and the
Supreme Court's considerations in deciding that reduction to practice is not necessary to
trigger the on sale bar).
79. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (1987).
80. Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
81. See Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
82. See Mahurkar v. Impra, Inc., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (recognizing
the importance of the commercial nature requirement in determining whether the
invention is subject to the on sale bar).
83. See, e.g., In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 791-92 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
[F]or § 102(b) to apply, it is not necessary that a sale be consummated. It suffices
that the claimed invention, reduced to practice, was placed on sale, i.e., offered
to potential customers, prior to the critical date .... Even if no delivery is made
prior to the critical date, the existence of a sales contract prior to that date has
been held to constitute an "on sale" status for the invention if it has been
reduced to a reality.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Mahurkar, 71 F.3d at 1577.
[C]ommercialization is the central focus for determining whether the patented
invention has been placed on sale.... Because we conclude that [the licensee's]
sale to [the kidney center] was a sham that did not result in "commercialization"
of the invention or place it in the public domain, no § 102(b) sale occurred even
though the prototype was a reduction to practice of the invention.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
85. The Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit's "totality of the
circumstances" approach, which had been applied to decide whether an act falls within
the statutory "public use or on sale" or experimental use exception doctrine, as being
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Another complexity in the current § 102(a) and (b) results
from a distinction between foreign and domestic prior art
depending on the place of disclosure.86 Under the current U.S.
patent statute, only information described in a published patent
or printed publication constitutes the prior art.87 If information is
merely "known or used" or "in public use or on sale," such
information must be available in the United States to constitute
the prior art under § 102(a) and (b).88 However, the progress of
technology made electronic publication easy and, in turn, made it
difficult to determine if such publication meets the statutory
meaning of "printed publication." If information falls within the
meaning of "printed publication," the USPTO does not need to
distinguish foreign from domestic information." Thus, the
USPTO clarified that the meaning of "printed publication"
includes electronic publication with the condition that such
publication is available to those who relate to the field of subject
matter disclosed in the publication." First-to-file countries also
addressed this difficulty and removed the distinction between
foreign and domestic prior art, and between written and
unwritten form, making prior art information that has become
available in any form anywhere.'
b. § 102(c) and (d). The novelty rule, under the U.S. first-
to-invent approach, includes additional grounds for preventing
an inventor from obtaining a patent--§ 102(c) and (d) statutory
bars." These bars do not exist under the first-to-file principle and
make the U.S. novelty provision lengthier.
Subsection 102(c) provides that an inventor's abandonment
of an invention prevents an inventor from obtaining a patent on
the invention. 3 This act of abandonment should be read as
distinct from the abandonment outlined in § 102(g) because, once
§ 102(c) abandonment is found, an inventor loses his right to
unnecessarily vague and uncertain. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66 n.11.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 434-35 (9th Cir.
1973).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b); Manual for Patent Examining Procedure § 2128 (8th ed.
2001) [hereinafter MPEP], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
documents/2100.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
90. MPEP, supra note 89, at 2128.
91. E.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54(2), at 272; Japanese
Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29(1).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c)-(d).
93. Id. § 102(c).
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obtain a patent forever and is then unable to recover the right.94
In contrast, § 102(g) abandonment does not result in a loss of
right to obtain a patent.95 When an inventor resumes her work
before the second person to reduce the invention to practice
conceives the same invention, the inventor can rely on the date of
resuming the activity to file an application and obtain a patent.96
This distinction is only visible through investigating court
interpretations of § 102(c) and (g).97
An even more confusing aspect of § 102(c) abandonment is
its relationship with "public use or on sale" under § 102(b). The
leading early Supreme Court case, Kendall v. Winsor, suggests
that an inventor can abandon the right to obtain a patent not
only by an express declaration of abandonment, but also when
acts of an inventor indicate an intent to abandon the right.98 Such
acts include acquiescence in the use of the invention by others,
delay in enforcing rights, or an attempt to withhold the benefit of
the invention.99 However, the acts the Kendall Court listed to
constitute abandonment are now subsumed into § 102(b)100
because courts include within the meaning of "public use or on
sale" a delay in filing an application while commercially
exploiting an invention.' It is not clear whether any act that
does not give rise to a public use or on sale falls within the
meaning of § 102(c). No court has found an abandonment relying
on an act during the grace period.0 2 An early Supreme Court
decision suggests that a delay in filing an application while
keeping the invention secret does not constitute abandonment.'
94. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.03[21, at 6-208 to 6-210.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
96. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97. See, e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858) (revealing particular actions
that may result in a finding of abandonment that will prohibit an inventor from receiving
a valid patent); Paulik, 760 F.2d at 1272-73 (analyzing and interpreting § 102(g)
abandonment).
98. Kendall, 62 U.S. at 329 ("[Ilt is the unquestionable right of every inventor to
confer gratuitously the benefits of his ingenuity upon the public, and this he may do
either by express declaration or by conduct equally significant with language.").
99. Id. at 328-31.
100. See 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.03[1](c][i], at 6-204 (suggesting
that § 102(b) may "give[] an inventor an absolute right during the grace period to decide
whether or not to apply for a patent").
101. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. Impra, Inc., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that commercial exploitation of an invention may place a device "on sale" for
purposes of § 102(b)).
102. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.03[1][c][i], at 6-204.
103. Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 46 (1878) ("Inventors may ... keep their inventions
secret; and if they do for any length of time, they do not forfeit their right to apply for a
patent, unless another in the mean time has made the invention, and secured by patent
the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the patented improvement.").
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As a result, § 102(c) abandonment is seldom relied upon to reject
or invalidate a patent.
1 4
Another statutory bar provision that does not exist under
the first-to-file principle is foreign patenting under § 102(d). This
bar also shares the same problem as § 102(a) and (b) regarding
the question of when and whether a foreign patent falls within
the meaning of § 102(d)."°5 This section was originally added to
encourage foreign applicants who obtain patent protection
abroad to promptly file with the USPTO. 116 When the United
States joined the Paris Convention, 7 this goal was already well-
served by the priority system under the Convention, which
requires applicants who filed an application in one of the Paris
Union member states to file in another country within one year
of the application date of the early filing (priority) date."8
Meeting the requirement under the Paris Convention
automatically satisfies the one-year filing requirement under
§ 102(d). °9 Therefore, § 102(d) is seldom relied upon for rejecting
claims or invalidating patents.
Additionally, § 102(d) has a serious flaw in that it unfairly
discriminates against inventions made outside the United States
because it imposes an additional bar to foreign-originated
inventions. Thus, it is arguable that § 102(d) may violate the
non-discrimination provision of the World Trade Organization
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) with respect to the place of
invention."0 Not only is § 102(d) unnecessary and confusing
104. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.03, at 6-198 to 6-199.
105. Refer to notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
106. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.04, at 6-215.
107. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
108. Id. art. 4A, C, at 1631-32. For a general discussion of § 102(d) and the Paris
Convention, see Donald Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United
States Law, 11 IIC: INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26, 44-47 (Friedrich-Karl
Beir et al. eds., 1980).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2000); Paris Convention, supra note 107, art. 4A, C, 21
U.S.T. at 1631-32 ("Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent... in one of
the countries of the Union ... shall enjoy, for purposes of filing in the other countries, a
right of priority during the [one-year] periods hereinafter fixed [for patents]."). To give
rise to the § 102(d) statutory bar, both of the following two conditions must be met: (1)
issuance of a patent in a foreign country prior to filing of the U.S. patent application, and
(2) filing of a foreign patent application more than twelve months before the U.S.
application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d).
110. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t.-agm0-e.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2002)
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because of the interpretation of a foreign patent, but it also
provides a source of criticism from U.S. trade partners.11'
Although there is very little justification, this provision presents
another hurdle for U.S. inventors and makes the novelty
provision complex.
c. § 102(e). The distinct policies related to novelty, with
respect to actors of disclosures, introduced another complexity in
determining novelty under § 102(e). The U.S. first-to-invent
principle introduces two separate concepts by distinguishing (1) a
priority or senior right in obtaining a patent from (2) the
defensive effect of preventing a third party from obtaining a
patent that relates to the statutory bar events under § 102(b), (c),
and (d)."' In interpreting the effect of priority right under the
Paris Convention Article 4B, U.S. scholars read the article not to
bind only a defensive patent-defeating effect."3 Applying this
interpretation to the definition of the prior art in § 102(e), the
USPTO and U.S. courts give the effect of priority only with
respect to claimed subject matter, while refusing to give the same
effect to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. This is because
the latter subject matter does not relate to a priority or senior
right and only relates to a defensive effect."14 In contrast, to avoid
this complexity, most first-to-file countries give the effect of
priority under the Paris Convention to both claimed and
unclaimed subject matter. 15 However, the language of § 102(e)
does not make clear the different timings required to become
prior art with respect to claimed and unclaimed subject matter.1 6
(declaring that "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention").
111. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 521-22 (acknowledging "the significance of patent
harmonization as a trade issue" and the failure of the United States to adopt a patent
system that is "in line with the rest of the world").
112. ADELMAN, supra note 45, at 824 (advancing that "the Paris Convention patentee
is given a patent-defeating right retroactive to the priority date for what is claimed in the
patent," but noting that most countries "employ a 'whole continents' patent-defeating
effect that covers everything disclosed in the priority document that is carried forward
into the patent application").
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 863 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (applying the Milburn
rule, which proclaims "[that a complete description of an invention in a U.S. patent
application, filed before the date of invention of another, if it matures into a patent, may
be used to show that the other was not the first inventor," and acknowledging that "[t]his
was a patent-defeating judge-made rule and now is [§] 102(e)").
115. Reinhard Wieczorek, Convention Applications as Patent-Defeating Prior Rights,
6 IIC: INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 135, 156-65 (Friedrich-Karl Beir et al.
eds., 1975) ("The current international trend is clearly toward the adoption of a 'whole-
contents approach.'").
116. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000).
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Literally interpreted, it requires that the invention be described
in an application for a patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention, and it does not specify in which part
of the application the invention must be described.117 When one
interprets the language in context of the benefit given to an early
application in the operation of § 119, he or she would readily
conclude that the same prior art effect would be given to both
claimed and unclaimed subject matter.
This reasonable interpretation is supported by the fact that
the USPTO once adopted this interpretation but gave it up when
it was instructed by the Hilmer court to adopt a more complex
interpretation for limiting the effect to claimed subject matter."8
The Hilmer court upheld this complex interpretation only after
extensively reviewing the legislative history and emphasizing the
necessity of limiting secret prior art."9 This practice of
distinguishing a priority, or senior right, from a patent-defeating
right confuses both U.S. and foreign inventors and makes it
difficult to determine if their inventions are patentable with
respect to an early application filed by a third party under
§ 102(e).
d. §102(g). Finally, § 102(g) provides another category of
secret prior art-an invention by the first inventor that has
become known only after the date of invention by the second
inventor.' Secret prior inventions under § 102(g) introduce a
significant uncertainty in U.S. patent validity because the
USPTO cannot find such inventions during the examination. The
inventor of the prior invention can challenge the validity of a
patent only after it issues.
To reduce this uncertainty, the U.S. patent system
introduced a series of limitations to challenge patents based on
secret prior inventions. First, the U.S. patent system introduced
the concepts of abandonment, concealment, and suppression to
prevent first inventors from challenging the validity of a patent
issued to the second inventor. 121 When an inventor unreasonably
delays in filing an application, courts find abandonment,
117. Id.
118. Hilmer, 359 F.2d at 876-77 (reasoning that to give effect to both claimed and
unclaimed subject matter "has the practical potential effect of pushing back the date of
unpublished, secret disclosures, which ultimately have effect as prior art references in the
form of U.S. patents, by the full one-year priority period of § 119").
119. Id. at 878.
120. ADELMAN, supra note 45, at 312 (canvassing the functions of § 102(g) including
its role in an interference and its function as another category of prior art).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
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concealment, and suppression, thus the putative first inventors
are precluded from challenging the validity.'22 Second, the U.S.
patent system introduced a procedure that precludes a claim
from the first inventor challenging the validity in an interference
procedure unless the claim is raised within one year from the
date of issuance of the U.S. patent.
123
Despite court attempts to limit the challenge, § 102(g) secret
prior inventions still bring significant uncertainty to the validity
of U.S. patents because courts refuse to adopt a strict test to
determine the time necessary to give rise to estoppel. 124 Moreover,
courts may let first inventors rely on the conception as long as
they can establish their continuous diligence up to the date of
reduction to practice.' 2' As a result, current practice allows
inventors to predate the date of the second invention beyond the
grace period, and has no limitation to date back to the conception
as long as the first inventors continue to work on the invention to
reduce it to practice.'26
In short, the U.S. first-to-invent novelty provision is very
complex and lengthy. Some terms are redundant and
unnecessary and others are confusing, which makes it difficult
for U.S. inventors to show the novelty of their invention.
Moreover, the interpretation U.S. courts give to some of the
terms departs from the ordinary meaning, thereby confusing
inventors not familiar with U.S. case law.
2. Priority. Subsections 102(f) and (g) codify the rule
developed by U.S. courts to determine the "first and true
inventor" under the patent statute. 127 However, U.S. courts give
special interpretation to the terms used in § 102(g); therefore, the
rule is almost impossible to understand without knowledge of
U.S. court decisions. For example, § 102(g) prevents an inventor
122. See, e.g., Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. RAM Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 35-37 (7th Cir.
1975) (clarifying the issues of abandonment, concealment, and suppression, and also
"conclud[ing] that a public use of an invention forecloses a finding of suppression or
concealment").
123. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b).
124. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(acknowledging that "the circumstances surrounding the first inventor's delay and the
reasonableness of that delay are important factors regarding the minimum and maximum
periods necessary to establish an inference of suppression or concealment").
125. See, e.g., Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 399-400 (C.C.P.A. 1959) ("As long as
Bradley was ... diligent in working actually to reduce his invention to practice, he was
not under an obligation to file a patent application.").
126. See 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.0311], at 10-24 (stating that the
first person to conceive of the idea is still the first inventor as long as he is reasonably
diligent in reducing the idea to practice prior to the date of the second invention).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)-(g).
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from obtaining a patent even if the inventor is the first-to-invent
when the inventor abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the
invention.'28 Although the patent statute lists three separate
acts-abandonment, suppression, and concealment-U.S. courts
do not distinguish one from the other.'29 Instead, the three acts
connote one concept relating a delay in disclosing the invention
by filing a patent application 3 °  or commercializing the
invention. 3' Such delay gives rise to the possibility of
"abandonment, suppression, or concealment" regardless of the
inventor's intent.' 2 This interpretation departs from the ordinary
meaning of the terms used in § 102(g) and misleads inventors not
familiar with court interpretations.
In addition, although § 102(g) made clear a rule to consider
both the dates of conception and reduction to practice to
determine the priority of invention, courts made it a primary rule
to give priority to the first person who reduces the invention to
practice.'33 Giving priority to the first person who conceived the
invention is an exception and applies only if the first-to-conceive
exercised reasonable diligence in reducing the invention to
practice from a time just prior to when the first person who
reduces the invention to practice enters the field.' The second
exception to the rule giving priority to a person who reduces the
invention to practice is when the person has abandoned,
suppressed, and concealed the invention. 3' However, the
sentence of § 102(g) providing this exception uses the term "the
invention was made."'36 Obvious questions from first-to-file
patent professionals are: "What constitutes an act of invention?"
128. Id. § 102(g)(2).
129. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.08[1], at 10-274.
130. E.g., Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen there is an
unreasonable delay between the actual reduction to practice and the filing of a patent
application, there is basis for inferring abandonment, suppression or concealment.").
131. E.g., Dunlop Holdings, Ltd. v. RAM Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975)
("[P]ublic use of an invention forecloses a finding of suppression or concealment even
though the use does not disclose the discovery .... If the new idea is permitted to have its
impact in the marketplace,... it surely has not been suppressed in an economic sense.").
132. See 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.08[1], at 10-274 (stating that the
subjective desire of an inventor not to abandon and to exploit the invention later may not
suffice to preclude a finding of abandonment, suppression, and concealment).
133. See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Priority goes to the
first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it was
the first to conceive the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later
reducing that invention to practice."). For a general discussion of the priority rules, see 3
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1, at 10-24 to 10-47.
134. See 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1], at 10-24.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
136. Id. § 102(g).
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and "How can one establish the date of invention?" The answers
are not easily derived from the statute because, although § 102(g)
requires an invention to be made in this country, it does not
define the meaning of "made in this country." It simply describes
the rule of priority using the terms such as "reduction to
practice" and "conception" without explaining the relationship
between the invention made and these terms.' Without reading
U.S. case law, it is impossible to understand how the act of the
invention "being made" relates to an act of reducing the invention
to practice and conception.
Further, § 102(g) does not define the term of reducing an
invention to practice, although the term is highly technical and
not used other than by patent specialists. Courts interpret the
term to include only two types of activity: (1) constructive
reduction to practice by filing an application for a patent with a
disclosure complying with § 112 requirements;"8 and (2) actual
reduction to practice by constructing a product or performing a
process that is read on by the claims and confirming the
suitability of the product or process for its intended purpose.
139
Accordingly, the U.S. priority provision also is difficult for U.S.
inventors to understand without fully appreciating U.S. case law
on the priority rule under § 102(g) because the most important
concept, "invention being made," is not clearly defined. The rule
and its exceptions also are unclear from the language of § 102(g).
The statute is simply user-unfriendly and written only for patent
lawyers.
C. Discrepancy Between Statutory Language and Practice
A more serious problem presented by the novelty and
priority provisions under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is a discrepancy
137. Id.
138. An inventor may apply for a patent application on an invention before the
invention is actually reduced to practice if the inventor is able to provide a disclosure
sufficient to meet § 112, which requires a specification containing a disclosure "in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art.., to make
and use the [invention.]" 35 U.S.C. § 112. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "[tihe filing of a patent application serves as conception and
constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the application"); see
also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1998) (holding that an inventor was
time-barred from obtaining a patent because he could have obtained a patent at least a
year earlier when he provided a manufacturer with a description and drawings that had
"sufficient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the matter" to produce the.
device).
139. See, e.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("When testing is
necessary to show proof of actual reduction to practice, the embodiment relied upon as
evidence of priority must actually work for its intended purpose.").
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between the statutory language and practice. Although § 102(a)
and (e) make clear that novelty is determined as of the date of
invention, the USPTO determines the novelty for the vast
majority of applications as of the date of application. 141 In
interference proceedings, the USPTO also follows a first-to-file
approach by imposing on second-to-file inventors the ultimate
burden of showing the priority.' Due to the difficulty in meeting
this burden, the U.S. priority rule grants the priority to first-to-
file inventors far more frequently than to second-to-file
inventors.' Labeling the current U.S. practice as first-to-invent
is misleading. Many U.S. inventors may have lost their patent
rights, believing that the United States follows the first-to-invent
approach and thus delaying an application.
1. Novelty.
a. §102(a) and (e). The language of § 102(a) and (e)
requiring novelty as of the date of invention is misleading
because it departs from the USPTO examination practice.' To
avoid the necessity of showing an invention date for every
application, the USPTO examines the novelty of a vast majority
of applications under § 102(a) and (e) as of the application date,'
because the filing date of a U.S. patent application with an
adequate disclosure of the invention is presumed to be the
140. See 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1][c][i], at 10-32 to 10-33
(noting that the USPTO presumes the date of invention to be the date the application is
filed, and that the burden is on the inventor to prove an earlier date of invention if he
wishes to carry back his date of invention to avoid citation of a reference in an ex parte
prosecution of the application in the patent office).
141. 37 C.F.R. § 1.657 (2001).
142. See Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Interf. 2001) (noting an approximate 75% success rate for senior parties over junior
parties); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Q.J. 193, 217 (1989)
(same); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No
Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 425, 427 (2002)
(demonstrating that during the period between 1983 and 2000, of the total of 2858
interference cases, 1917 were favorable to the first-to-file inventors). But see Charles L.
Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOc'Y 163, 181 (2002) (noting a conflict between the approximate 75% success rate
for senior parties stated in Edwards and the last interference statistics published by the
USPTO, which reported a 52.5% success rate); Mark Lemley & Colleen Chien, Are the
U.S. Priority Rules Really Necessary?, Draft address submitted for the 2002 CASRIP High
Technology Summit Conference (July 20, 2002) (copy on file with author) (indicating that
43% of junior parties won in the cases that are litigated to judgment and actually resolved
on priority grounds).
143. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e).
144. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1][c] [i], at 10-32 to 10-33.
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invention date.145 Only if an examiner finds a reference published
earlier than the filing date is an inventor given a chance to
eliminate the prior art reference by showing an earlier invention,
unless the subject matter is claimed in a U.S. patent.146 However,
unsophisticated inventors often fail to take advantage of this
practice because they do not keep records of the activities that
resulted in the invention and cannot show an earlier invention
with corroborative evidence.147
The language of § 102(a) and (e) indicates that the date of
invention is the critical date at which novelty must be
demonstrated and does not reflect accurately the USPTO practice
of examining the novelty as of the invention date only on an ad
hoc basis."4 The language of the statute would more accurately
coincide with practice if it made clear that the novelty of an
application is examined as of the date of application unless an
inventor can establish an early date of invention with
corroborative evidence. Because the current language of § 102(a)
and (e) does not make clear an examination of novelty as of the
date of application, many U.S. inventors may have lost their
right to a patent because they are unable to produce
corroborative evidence showing an early date of invention.
b. §102(b) Grace Period. The view that the United States
effectively has a first-to file system is also supported by the fact that
§ 102(b) functions like the priority and novelty provisions in
countries using a true first-to-file system.'49 This is because when
the USPTO relies on § 102(b), it determines the patentability of
inventions based on the date of application, with certain activities
occurring more than one year prior to the filing date serving as an
absolute bar to patentability. 0 Since the Supreme Court's Pennock
decision in 1829, inventions have been excluded from the definition
of first inventions if they were publicly used or on sale prior to the
145. Compare Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1878) (recognizing that there is a
presumption that the invention described in a patent was made at the time the
application was filed), with Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that the filing date of an application did not constitute constructive reduction to practice
when the application did not support all of the limitations of the claims).
146. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131. Further, an inventor can eliminate a prior art reference by
showing that the reference is his own work. 37 C.F.R. § 1.132.
147. See, e.g., Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 920 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (finding that the
inventor failed to establish his diligence because of a lack of corroborative evidence to
support his activity).
148. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e).
149. See ADELMAN, supra note 45, at 206. However, these provisions serve a
philosophically different role in the first-to-invent system from the first-to-file system, as
their functions are keyed with the patent-defeating activity, which removes the priority.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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filing date.'51 The 1836 Patent Act, which codified Pennock's holding,
required novelty as of the date of application and thus functioned
exactly like the novelty provision of first-to-file countries, although
the underlying policy relating to the novelty provision differed from
that of the first-to-file novelty provision."' The introduction of a
grace period by the Patent Act of 1839 made it possible for inventors
to obtain patents on publicly known inventions as of the filing date
only if an application was filed within the grace period.' This
means that the U.S. patent system awards patents to inventions
that are new and non-obvious as of the filing date, with a one-year
grace period during which inventors are allowed to exploit their
inventions to find commercial value.
The U.S. patent system frequently fails to award first
inventors when the inventors delay in filing an application and
more than one year has passed from the time the invention is in
"public use or on sale" in this country.' A good example is the
invention in Lough v. Brunswick Corp.'5' In Lough, the inventor,
Mr. Lough, constructed six prototypes of his invention-a marine
propulsion device for boats-and gave them to his friends to
allegedly conduct testing of the invention's performance more
than one year prior to filing a patent application for the
invention.5 6 Unfortunately, he did not keep records on his
testing.'7 Obviously, Mr. Lough's device functioned well and did
not receive complaints from his friends using his device in their
boats. Thus, he did not need to inspect or repair his device on his
friends' boats.'58 A jury found Brunswick Corp. guilty of
infringing Mr. Lough's patent, and the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida denied Brunswick's motion for
judgment as a matter of law that the patent was invalid under
§ 102(b)." 9 A panel of the Federal Circuit found that the court
erred in denying Brunswick's motion, noting that the inventor
did not produce any objective evidence of experimentation such
as a record of testing or inspection on the devices installed in his
151. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (holding that a public use or sale
of an invention prior to filing a patent application is a bar to obtaining a claim for the
invention).
152. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, § 6, reprinted in 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS,
supra note 59, app. 11.
153. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353, § 7, reprinted in 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS,
supra note 59, app. 13.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
155. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 1116.
157. Id. at 1121.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1118.
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friends' boats. 16 In examining a request for en banc consideration
of Lough, the dissent showed great sympathy for the inventor.'
Nevertheless, the court declined to hear the case en banc. 6' Had
the inventor known that he should file an application within one
year from the date he made the invention known to his friends
without any confidential relationship, he likely would have filed
an application sooner and would not have lost the right for a
patent on his invention. With the presence of a provision that
determines the novelty as of the date of application even with a
one-year grace period, labeling the U.S. novelty requirement as
following a first-to-invent system misleads U.S. inventors and
may have caused many inventors, like Mr. Lough, who waited too
long to file a patent to lose their patent rights.
2. Priority Provision. The heart of the U.S. first-to-invent
system, the priority rule under § 102(g), also in practice
primarily follows the first-to-file principle.6 3 This is because the
procedural rule gives preference to inventors who file an
application first.' In an interference procedure, the person who
filed an application first for the particular subject matter in
question is called a senior party and all other applicants filing
later than the first applicant are called junior parties. When an
inventor is a senior party, she may simply rely on her application
date as the date of invention and is still very likely to be awarded
with priority, because junior parties bear a series of burdens of
proof to establish the priority over the first applicant's date of
invention.'66
First, the USPTO declares an interference only when "(1)
there is 'interfering subject matter in the applications or in the
application and the patent,"' and (2) the "subject matter is
patentable to the applicant."'67 An interference can be declared
among applications and among applicants and patentees, but an
interference among applications is declared only if an examiner
happens to know the claims in the other applications and
initiates an interference.'68 It was possible for an applicant to
160. Id. at 1122.
161. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
162. Id. at 1518.
163. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
164. 37 C.F.R. § 1.657 (2001).
165. Id. § 1.601(m).
166. For a short discussion of interference proceedings, see ADELMAN, supra note 45,
at 322-24.
167. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.09[2][a], at 10-327 to 10-328.
168. Id. § I0.09[2] [b], at 10-328.
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provoke an interference; however, applicants were seldom able to
do so because U.S. patent applications were kept secret until
issuance before the 1999 Patent Act Revision introduced an early
publication system.
169
When an applicant-junior party tries to invoke an
interference with a patent, and her application date is more than
three months after a patentee's filing date, she must demonstrate
a prima facie case for the entitlement of priority over the
patentee.'7 ° This practice may present a high hurdle to overcome
for unsophisticated inventors," When an applicant-junior party
fails to make a claim to substantially the same subject matter
prior to one year from the issuance date of the patent, the junior
party's attempt to challenge her claim for an interference is
precluded by a procedural bar.'72 Even having the USPTO declare
an interference is a difficult task for those who did not file first
because they bear the burden of demonstrating that they are
prima facie entitled to an earlier filing date.'73
Even a junior party successfully having the USPTO declare
an interference will bear the burden of going forward with
evidence as to the date of actual reduction to practice or early
conception.'74 Because the date of application, with a disclosure to
meet the § 112 requirements, is presumed to be the date of
invention,' a senior party has the initial burden only if he
chooses to show an actual reduction to practice or an early
conception with diligence.' A senior party may otherwise choose
a strategy concentrating on disproving the date of invention the
junior party tries to establish.
Throughout an interference proceeding, a junior party bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to all issues of
fact to establish the priority.' If the junior party filed an
application before issuance of a patent to the first-to-file, the
169. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
170. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (2001).
171. See, e.g., Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that an
inventor was unable to show a prima facie actual reduction to practice because of a lack of
corroborative evidence). Hahn also includes an excellent summary of the USPTO
procedure for declaring an interference between an applicant and a patentee. Id. at 1030.
172. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b); see also In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 680 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
("Essentially, [35 U.S.C. § 135(b)] operates as a statute of limitations on copying claims
for the purpose of instigating interferences.").
173. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b).
174. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1][c][iij-[iii], at 10-34 to 10-35.
175. E.g., Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1878).
176. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1] [c) [ii], at 10-34.
177. E.g., Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the
junior party bears the burden of proving prior conception and reduction to practice).
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burden of persuasion is on the junior party to show an earlier
invention with proof by a preponderance of the evidence.178 If a
patent was issued to the first-to-file by the time the junior party
filed an application, the junior party must show an earlier
invention with proof by clear and convincing evidence.7 9 Further,
U.S. case law requires applicants to produce corroborative
evidence regarding the complex legal concepts required to show
priority.8 ° Due to this heavy burden, in three out of four cases
junior parties lose in interference proceedings."' Taking into
account inventors who fail to establish a prima facie priority and
thus are unable to have the USPTO declare an interference, the
chance for second-to-file inventors being awarded with priority is
slim.182
In addition to this difficulty of showing an early invention,
the high cost associated with an interference proceeding
discourages second-to-file inventors from taking advantage of the
first-to-invent priority rule.' As a result, only a very small
portion of U.S. applications, less than 0.1%, engage in the
priority contest in an interference proceeding.' It thus follows
that under the current USPTO interference practice, the scope of
the first-to-invent exception is very narrow.
The first-to-invent system is often viewed as being more
favorable to small inventors than the first-to-file system.'
178. Id. at 541-42.
179. E.g., Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rephrased the evidentiary standard from "beyond a
reasonable doubt" to "clear and convincing" in order to bring it in line with recent
Supreme Court decisions).
180. E.g., Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
181. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 142, at 217 (indicating that senior parties win 75%
of the interferences).
182. A conflict exists between the assessment of the Edwards panel and the last
interference statistics published by the USPTO. Compare Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 2001) (recognizing that a panel of
the trial section at the USPTO Board noted a 75% success rate for senior parties over
junior parties) and Mossinghoff, supra note 142, at 427 (suggesting that, during the
period between 1983 and 2000, approximately 67% of the total 2858 interference cases
were favorable to first-to-file inventors), with Charles L. Gholz, supra note 142, at 181
(contending that the board's latest statistics reveal that the senior party prevailed 52.5%
of the time, and the junior party prevailed 31.7% of the time).
183. See Macedo, supra note 142, at 218-19 (estimating that conducting
interferences costs patent applicants approximately $15,000,000 per year). According to a
survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) in
2001, the median of the estimated total cost, inclusive, in a two-party interference is
$201,000. AIPLA, Report of Economic Survey 2001, 90 (2001).
184. Mossinghoff, supra note 142, at 427.
185. See Conley, supra note 3, at 782-83 (arguing that the current first-to-invent
system, which does not require inventors to file immediately, encourages and protects
inventors by allowing them to proceed slowly with the further development of the
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However, this assessment is a myth.'86 It is doubtful that many
inventors with limited budgets can afford to take advantage of
the expensive interference regime. Small inventors believe the
first-to-invent principle favors them in that they can rely on a
mere conception of an invention and remove the financial burden
of filing an application.187 However, mere conception is never
sufficient to show a date of invention under the current U.S.
first-to-file priority rule. 88 Because the priority rule requires a
reduction of the invention to practice, 9 the U.S. first-to-invent
principle may in fact disfavor small inventors depending on the
type of invention. Under the § 102(g) priority rule, granting
patent rights to the first person who reduces the invention to
practice is the primary rule.19 This primary rule is supported by
the patent policy that encourages not only creation of useful
inventions but also disclosure of inventions through a reduction
of the invention to practice.' 9' An inventor can reduce his
invention to practice by filing an application with the USPTO"9'
or by constructing and testing a prototype. 9' Although small
inventors express their concern over filing costs,' constructing
and testing a prototype is often even more expensive than filing
an application.'95 It follows that, in many cases, a first-to-file
system in fact favors small inventors by saving costs for
constructing and testing a prototype and attorneys' fees for
establishing the priority.
The priority rule provides an exception to the first to reduce
to practice principle by allowing inventors to rely on the date of
invention).
186. See Mossinghoff, supra note 142, at 428 (analyzing USPTO data and concluding
that the first-to-invent system provides no advantage to small entities); Lemley & Chien,
supra note 142 (concluding that their empirical data do not support the contention that
the first-to-invent system favors small inventors over large companies).
187. First-to-invent advocates focus solely on the cost of application but pay no
attention to the cost of reducing the invention to practice, which is necessary for
establishing the priority under the U.S. first-to-invent system. See, e.g., Conley, supra
note 3, at 783 (recognizing that before an inventor can profit from his invention, money
must be expended to develop the invention to the point of commercialization).
188. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
189. See id.
190. See id.; 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1], at 10-24 (providing a
general discussion of the priority rule).
191. 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.08[1], at 10-274.
192. See, e.g., Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
193. See, e.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
194. See Conley, supra note 3, at 783.
195. This observation is based on University of Houston Law Center experience in
trying to attract commercial backing for faculty inventions. See Professor Paul M.
Janicke, Address at the Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium
in Santa Fe, New Mexico (May 31, 2002).
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conception.'96 However, unless an inventor reduces the invention
to practice, he or she cannot rely on the conception date. 97
Moreover, an inventor must continuously work on the invention
to reduce it to practice because the inventor's lack of activity on
the invention gives rise to lack of diligence and prevents the
inventor from relying on the date of conception.9 Even if an
inventor reduces the invention to practice, an unreasonable delay
in filing an application with the USPTO gives rise to
abandonment and prevents an award of priority.'99
Unfortunately, lack of funding seldom justifies a delay caused by
lack of diligence or abandonment."'
In short, the current U.S. first-to-file priority rule disfavors
inventors who stop working on an invention before filing an
application with the USPTO. To establish the priority, he or she
must show continuous work by corroborative evidence." 1 It is
very likely that a practice of maintaining records on the
continuous work is more expensive than the practice of filing an
application early. Moreover, taking into account the hardships
that a first-to-conceive but second-to-reduce-to-practice inventor
encounters under the current priority rule, the belief that the
U.S. first-to-invent system favors small inventors is not only
false, but also misleading. Many unsophisticated inventors may
lose a chance to obtain a patent because they are misled by the
labeling of the U.S. patent system as being "first-to-invent," thus
believing their early conception of an invention can establish
priority under § 102(g).
196. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000); see, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
802 F.2d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that Hybritech was entitled to priority due
to its earlier conception date); 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.03[1], at 10-24
(noting that first-to-conceive is an exception to the priority rule provided that the inventor
exercises diligence in reducing the invention to practice).
197. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2); Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836,
1841-42 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 2001) (stating that an inventor must construct a
prototype to show an actual reduction to practice).
198. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2); Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 919-21 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
(noting that reasonable diligence does not require one to give up his or her livelihood).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2); see also Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (finding a delay of fifty-one months to be unreasonably long). But see 3 CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 59, § 10.0714][b], at 10-261 (recognizing that "poverty or illness of
the inventor may render periods of inactivity or the general pace of activity reasonable
under the circumstances").
200. E.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 892, 893 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
1986) (finding that a university policy requiring researchers to obtain outside financial
support for projects did not excuse an inventor's lack of activity).
201. See, e.g., Gould, 363 F.2d at 919-20 (noting the corroboration requirement and
finding that the testimony of an inventor's wife did not sufficiently corroborate the
inventor's claim of diligence).
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III. PROPOSAL FOR REVISING § 102
A review of the language in § 102 has revealed that the
complexity of defining the prior art and confusing interpretations
given to the terms "public use or on sale" in the definition have
resulted from the necessity to remedy the problems inherent to a
true first-to-invent principle. The review has revealed that some
categories of the prior art in § 102 are simply outdated or
redundant, and thus unnecessary. It also has revealed categories
of the prior art that are unique to the first-to-invent principle
and that introduce a significant uncertainty in U.S. patent
validity. The perception that the first-to-invent principle favors
small inventors also misleads U.S. inventors. In short, the worst
problem of the U.S. first-to-invent principle is not that it differs
from patent systems from other countries, but that it is user-
unfriendly due to its difficulty to understand, which, accordingly,
harms U.S. inventors.
However, the examination and interference practice at the
USPTO follows the first-to-file principle, and the first-to-invent is
a narrow exception to the principle because inventors are given,
on an ad hoc basis, the ability to show priority by establishing an
early invention date. It follows that a revision of § 102, which will
reflect the USPTO practice and make clear the adoption of the
first-to-file principle, will not only simplify the definition of the
prior art but will also eliminate confusing interpretations
relating to "public use or on sale." Such a revision will alert
inventors to the risk of relying on the date of conception, which is
very expensive to establish and very likely to fail. Further, by
modeling novelty provisions of first-to-file countries, the § 102(b)
grace period should be restated in a separate provision as an
exception to the definition of the novelty as of the invention date.
Language allowing the determination of the novelty as of the
date of application with a one-year grace period will protect
inventors from losing a patent right for failure to file an
application within the grace period. Such a revised revision may
read:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) The invention was known or used in this country or
a foreign country before the date of application by the
applicant for patent, except that an applicant
establishes a date of the invention prior to the date of
the invention being known or used with corroborative
evidence;
(b) The invention was described in:
(1) an application for patent, published under
[39:621654
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section 122(b), by another filed in the United
States before the date of application by the
applicant for patent; or
(2) a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the date
of application by the applicant for patent; or
(3) an application filed with the benefit of right of
priority defined in section 119(a) and an
international application filed under the treaty
defined in section 351(a) shall have the same effect
under this subsection of a national application
published under section 122(b);
(c) He did not himself invent the subject matter sought
to be patented.
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), a person shall be
entitled to a patent if the invention was made publicly
known or used by the inventor in this country or a foreign
country during the twelve months preceding the date of
application.
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), a person shall be
entitled to a patent if the person can establish with
corroborative evidence that the person made the invention
(1) before the date that the invention was known or used as
defined in subsection (a), or (2) before the date of the
application filed by another defined in subsection (b).
In determining priority of invention under this section,
(a) Current section (g)(1)
(b) A priority is granted to a person who first reduces
the invention to practice in this country unless the
person has not abandoned the invention or a person
who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice
can show the reasonable diligence from a time prior to
the conception by the other to that person's date of
reduction to practice.
A. Novelty
1. Merge § 102(a) and (b). The proposed revision of § 102(a)
merges the current § 102(a) and (b); restates the prior art to
reflect the first-to-file practice at the USPTO in examining the
novelty under the current § 102(a); and adds an ad hoc exception
to the first-to-invent principle under Rule 131. The second
paragraph of the proposed revision provides separately for the
one-year grace period under § 102(b) and makes clear that
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inventors must file an application during the period once they
make the invention publicly known or used. To remove
redundant acts of disclosure, the proposed revision merges the
current § 102(a) and (b) and removes confusing definitions of
acts, such as "being patented," because disclosures through
patenting are subsumed into acts of "being known."
Further, to address the complexity resulting from the
geographical limitation on unwritten forms of prior art
information,2 °2 the proposed revision does not discriminate
foreign prior art information against domestic prior art
information. The sole reason for including the categories of the
prior art, described in a printed publication in the current
§ 102(a) and (b), is to distinguish written from unwritten forms of
prior art information that is defined as being "known or used in
this country."2" This is because only former information becomes
the prior art if the information is made available outside the
United States. Because the proposed revision removes the
geographical discrimination, the category of the prior art being
described in a printed publication is also subsumed into the
categories of the prior art being known in this country and thus
also removed from the proposed revision.
The proposed revision not only simplifies the definition of
the novelty and examination procedure, but also helps U.S.
inventors. Under the current system, because foreign activities
do not trigger the grace period, giving foreign applicants more
time to exploit the invention prior to filing for a U.S. patent in
their own countries, the geographical limitation functions against
U.S. inventors. 24 Further, it is arguable that the geographical
limitation on the prior art may violate the spirit of non-
discrimination under the TRIPS Agreement by conditioning the
effect of prior art on the place of invention.2 0
2. Removal of "Secret-Commercial-Use" and "Experimental-
Use." The proposed § 102(a) does not include the term "public
use" associated with the secret-commercial-use bar and
experimental-use exception doctrines. Thus, the proposed
202. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
203. Id.
204. See William LaMarca, Reevaluating the Geographical Limitation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b); Policies Considered, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 25, 36-37 (1996) (presenting
arguments made by proponents who urge the elimination of the inconsistent treatment of
U.S. and foreign inventors under § 102(b)).
205. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 110, art. 27 ("[P]atents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.").
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§ 102(a) should be interpreted to give an ordinary meaning to
"being known or used." The doctrines of the experimental-use
exception and secret-commercial-use bar were introduced to
promote the following four policies: (1) avoiding detrimental
reliance by the public regarding inventions the public reasonably
has come to believe are freely available; (2) encouraging early
disclosure through a patent application; (3) preserving a
reasonable time for the inventor to determine the potential value
of the invention; and (4) preventing an inventor from attempting
to extend the patent term by adding the period of secret use to
the statutory twenty years.2 6
Because the proposed § 102(a) makes clear a determination
of the novelty as of the date of application, all of these policies
can be well-served without the secret-commercial-use bar and
experimental-use exception doctrines. The novelty of the
application date discourages inventors from disclosing their
invention prior to filing an application with the USPTO, thereby
preventing reliance by a third party. Such novelty also gives
sufficient incentive for inventors to file early. The third policy is
well served by introduction as long as the current one-year grace
period is maintained. Because one year was selected as an
appropriate time for evaluating the value of the invention and
preparing a patent application, it is unreasonable to allow
inventors to keep experimenting with their inventions
indefinitely. The policy of early application is easily frustrated by
the presence of these doctrines because inventors can avoid
triggering a grace period by carefully drafting claims to
distinguish subject matter on sale, which effectively extends the
grace period."7 The fourth policy has marginal value under the
modern intellectual property system where trade secrets and
patents coexist.218 Under the first-to-file system, an inventor is
given an option to protect the invention as a trade secret while
taking the risk that a third party will file first.0 9 Because patent
206. See Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also
2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 6.02, at 6-5 to 6-8 (providing a general discussion
of the underlying policies).
207. See, e.g., UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that attempts to expand the grace period contravene the statute's policies).
208. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974) (observing that
"trade secret law does not produce any positive effects in the area of clearly patentable
inventions, as opposed to the beneficial effects resulting from trade secret protection in
the areas of the doubtfully patentable and the clearly unpatentable inventions").
209. Secret commercial use of an invention does not give rise to the prior art under
the EPC or JPL. European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 54(2), at 272; Japanese
Patent Law, supra note 16, art. 29(1). Like the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(SPLT) Article 8, information must have been made publicly available to constitute the
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owners in other countries enjoy this option, U.S. patent owners
are unfairly disadvantaged unless the same option is given by
adopting the first-to-file system.
The proposed § 102 eliminates the secret-commercial-use bar
and the experimental-use exception to prevent inventors from
being misled by the discrepancy between the statutory language
and court interpretation of the terms used in the statute. It also
increases the credibility of U.S. patent validity by eliminating the
term "public use or on sale," a term that introduces a lot of
uncertainty in patent validity. Thus, the removal of the term
"public use or on sale" not only simplifies and makes
understandable the novelty provision, but also improves the U.S.
patent system.
3. Removal of§ 102(c) and (d). The proposed § 102 revision
will make the § 102(c) abandonment provision unnecessary;
therefore, the proposed § 102 revision eliminates the current
§ 102(c). Even under the current novelty provision, § 102(c) has
very little justification to provide the bar separately from § 102(b)
and introduces only confusion with respect to § 102(g)
abandonment. Thus, the removal of § 102(c) will not only
contribute to the simplification of the U.S. novelty provision, but
will also clarify the statutory interpretation of the novelty
provision. The proposed § 102 revision will also remove § 102(d),
which the Paris Convention already has made useless and which
210
may also violate the TRIPS Agreement provision.
4. Revision of§ 102(e). The proposed § 102(b) is comparable
to the current § 102(e) in defining an early application pending in
the USPTO as the prior art.21' However, it makes clear a
determination of novelty as of the application date with an
exception of an ad hoc opportunity to establish an early invention
date and thus reflects the USPTO practice under Rule 131. The
proposed revision expressly gives the same effect of a domestic
application to both the benefit of priority under the Paris
Convention and an international application filed under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty. Thus, it overrules the Hilmer
doctrine.21
2
prior art. Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, art. 8 (Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Draft
Patent Treaty], available at http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/session-6/pdf/
scp6_2.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
210. Refer to notes 107-11 supra and accompanying text.
211. Refer to Part III supra (proposing a new § 102(b)); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000).
212. The Fifth Circuit summarized the Hilmer doctrine as follows: "[UMnder the
Hilmer I doctrine, a prior art reference patent is effective only as of its U.S. filing date."
Studiengeselleschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1337-38 (5th Cir.
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A removal of the Hilmer doctrine will better serve U.S.
inventors by removing the complex interpretation of the
discriminating effect regarding claimed and unclaimed subject
matter. 13 It also eliminates the illogical problems caused by the
doctrine that U.S. legal commentators extensively criticize.214 The
Hilmer doctrine also has been extensively criticized by foreign
legal commentators for violating the priority right provision
under the Paris Convention, as well as the non-discrimination
policy provision regarding the place of invention under the
TRIPS Agreement. 15
A worse problem is that the application of the Hilmer
doctrine results in a double patenting problem through the
issuance of separate multiple patents to obvious inventions.1 6
The double patenting problem is somewhat remedied by the
Deckler case because the Deckler court applied the interference
estoppel doctrine broadly and prevented the applicant from
seeking a second chance to request the priority contest with
respect to obvious inventions through an interference
proceeding.1 This expansive use of the estoppel doctrine
effectively prevents multiple patents from being issued on
obvious inventions as long as claims are contested through an
interference proceeding.1 Accordingly, some commentators even
1980).
213. Richard A. Neifeld, Viability of the Hilmer Doctrine, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 544, 546, 561-62 (1999) (explaining the complexity resulting from the courts'
interpretation that bifurcates (1) the date an application obtains priority from (2) the date
the patent granted on the application obtains prior art effect for applications filed outside
the United States).
214. See 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 59, § 14.05[31, at 14-69 n.6 ("It would be
illogical to give greater effect to a national filing in a foreign country than to an
international filing under the Treaty."); DONALD S. CHISUM, ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES
PATENT LAW 104 (2000) [hereinafter CHISUM, ELEMENTS] (Japanese language source);
Harold C. Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang-Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAVL L. 535, 558 (1996) (describing the Hilmer opinion as "a low point in judicial
understanding of international patent practice and treaties"). See generally Kevin L.
Leffel, Comment, Hilmer Doctrine and Patent System Harmonization: What Does a
Foreign Inventor Have at Stake?, 26 AKRON L. REV. 355 (1992) (providing an historical
analysis of the Hilmer doctrine and its effects).
215. Paris Convention, supra note 107, art. 4; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 110, art.
27(1). Professor Chisum also pointed out this problem. See 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra
note 59, § 14.05[3], at 14-70 n.6 ("Foreign scholars divide on whether Hilmer is contrary to
Article 4B of the Paris Convention."); CHISUM, ELEMENTS, supra note 214, at 104.
216. See Leffel, supra note 214, at 357 (explaining that the USPTO is forced to grant
multiple valid patents under Hilmer II).
217. See In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (giving interference
judgment preclusive effect through doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel).
218. See id. (stating that first interference judgment was used as "a basis for
rejection of claims to the same patentable invention").
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view the Deckler case as essentially overruling Hilmer.219
There are no justifiable reasons to keep the doctrine due to
these serious problems. First, disclosure of patentably-
indistinguishable inventions brings no benefits to the public." °
Second, the Hilmer court's major concern in using the foreign
priority date for a patent-defeating effect was to prevent the
expansion of secret prior art.221 This concern over secret prior art
has been significantly remedied by the introduction of an early
publication system under the American Inventor's Protection Act
of 1999 because the content of all applications will be
automatically published after eighteen months from the filing
date.2
22
In essence, the proposed § 102(b) simply clarifies the holding
of Deckler and removes the suspicion of violating the Paris
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. The revision results in
very little impact on USPTO practice under § 102(e) because the
Hilmer doctrine has been seldomly raised in the USPTO and
court proceedings since its adoption.22 However, it will help the
USPTO greatly by removing the complex novelty determination
of international applications.
5. Secret Prior Invention. The proposed revision removes
secret prior inventions under the current § 102(g). Because secret
prior inventions introduce uncertainty in patent validity, this
removal significantly improves the U.S. patent system.2 2 4 This
removal also greatly simplifies the novelty rule by making the
prior art only publicly available information, except for
unpublished applications pending in the USPTO under current
§ 102(e).
219. See, e.g., Charles E. Van Horn, Effects of GATT and NAFTA on PTO Practice, 77
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 231, 234 (1995) (noting that the doctrine of interference
estoppel "precludes two patents from issuing on patentable indistinct inventions").
220. See CHISUM, ELEMENTS, supra note 214, at 104; Neifeld, supra, note 213, at 553
(arguing that indistinguishable inventions increase the threat of suit from multiple
entities and "extend the temporal exclusive right on that patentable invention").
221. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("The board's new view, as
expressed in this case ... has the practical potential effect of pushing back the date of the
unpublished, secret disclosures, which ultimately will have effect as prior art references
in the form of U.S. patents, by the full one-year priority period of [§] 119.").
222. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
223. Only forty-five cases cite Hilmer over the past four decades. The Federal Circuit
has not cited Hilmer since Deckler was decided in 1992.
224. F. Andrew Ubel, Who's on First?-The Trade Secret Prior Use or a Subsequent
Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 401, 405 (1994) ("The inherent uncertainty
of our current first-to-invent system casts a shadow over the validity of the patent for its
entire term and may lessen the market value of United States patents. This uncertainty
exists because of our confusing treatment of secret prior art.").
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6. Inventorship. Although patent systems of first-to-file
countries do not require inventors to file an application under
their names, they do provide a recourse designed to prevent
applicants from obtaining a patent if the applicant did not legally
obtain a right for patent from the true inventor; this is common
to first-to-file countries.225 Thus, the proposed revision keeps the
current § 102(f) as it is.
B. Priority
1. Restatement of Current Practice. The third paragraph of
the proposed revision restates the current priority rule to make
clear the first-to-file principle in the USPTO interference
procedure. This language will be enough of an alert to inventors
who try to rely on the date of invention instead of the date of
application. Although the novelty requirement is restated under
the first-to-file principle, this revision decides a grant of patent,
between two inventors who disclosed their invention during the
grace period, by the first-to-invent principle. In other words,
when a third party discloses or files an application prior to the
date of application during the grace period, the patent is granted
to the first-to-invent who is able to establish the priority under
the current § 102(g) rule. This priority is established in an ex
parte procedure under Rule 131226 or an intra parte interference
procedure. 227 Further, the revision restates the current priority
rule to clarify the primary rule of reduction to practice and
exceptions of conception with continuous diligence and
abandonment by a person who first reduces the invention
practice. It also removes the redundant expression for
abandonment. This language will make it possible for inventors
to understand the rule with ease and without the knowledge of
court decisions to explain the rule.
2. Modest Proposal. The proposed revision will not change
any aspect of the current first-to-invent priority rule; thus, all
complexity in applying the priority rule and the current
expensive procedure in administering the priority remains with
the proposed revision. In addition, the proposed revision does not
remedy a significant uncertainty in patent validity resulting from
225. See European Patent Convention, supra note 15, art. 61, at 273-74 (allowing
three months for the true inventor to object); Japanese Patent Law, supra note 16, art.
113(1)(ii) (providing an opportunity for any person to oppose a patent due to a patent
being granted in contravention of Article 39(1)-(4)).
226. See 35 U.S.C. § 131.
227. See id. §§ 135, 291.
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the secret prior art. To make the U.S. patent system simple and
user-friendly, and to reduce the cost of administrating the
expensive interference procedure, it is necessary to limit the
scope of the exception of first-to-invent.
Although the most radical proposal should be to remove the
exception and move to the simple first-to-file rule, there are
modest options to limit the exception. The most modest option
models the grace period of first-to-file countries and prevents
inventors from establishing the date of invention beyond one year
prior to the application date. Under the current practice,
inventors are given opportunities to establish the date of
invention longer than the one-year grace period only with respect
to § 102(e), unpublished pending applications,228 and § 102(g),
prior inventions.29 All other disclosures in § 102 require public
access to the information of the invention and prevent inventors
from obtaining a patent once the disclosures occur more than one
year from the date of application. 2" The proposed revision will
remove the § 102(g) secret prior invention, thus the limitation
would only affect § 102(e) prior art.
Limiting the opportunity to remove § 102(e) prior art should
be marginal. Because the newly introduced early publication
system makes the content of early applications publicly
available,23' all early publications constitute § 102(b) prior art
once they are published. It follows that inventors predate § 102(e)
prior art up to thirty months under the current practice. The
proposed limitation reduces thirty months to twelve months.
However, even under the current practice, if inventors keep their
inventions confidential after the completion of the invention and
unreasonably delay in filing an application, courts may find
abandonment under § 102(g). Case law suggests that courts may
find abandonment for a fifteen- to seventeen-month delay.2"2 A
panel of the USPTO interference board also has supported an
examiner's practice of issuing a patent that was seventeen
months senior to another applicant .2" Thus, it is not
228. See id. § 122(b) (defining publication and exceptions to publication).
229. Refer to notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text (discussing the extension of
the grace period).
230. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), (d).
231. Id. § 122(b).
232. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that there is no per se minimum or maximum timeframe to establish suppression or
concealment).
233. See Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840-41 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interf. 2001).
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unreasonable to limit the exception of first-to-invent within the
grace period.
A more ambitious option is to limit the exception of first-to-
invent by applicants. This proposal will expand the current
exception to early publication for domestic inventors to include
first-to-invent priority. Under this exception, only applicants who
do not wish to file an application outside the United States will
be allowed to take advantage of the first-to-invent exception and
can establish an earlier invention date under the § 102(g) priority
rule.213 The impact of this limitation is also very marginal
because the majority of U.S. patent applicants and owners
already have adopted the practice of first-to-file if they are
interested in obtaining patents outside the United States. Unless
they follow the first-to-file principle, their rights for patent are
lost for lack of novelty or priority in major markets, such as
Europe and Japan. Thus, they are not significantly affected by
the removal of access to the first-to-invent exception.
This proposal of limiting the first-to-invent exception to
domestic applicants will greatly reduce the cases taken to an
interference proceeding, thereby reducing the administration
cost. Even if such an exception is provided, it is doubtful that
many U.S. applicants will take advantage of the exception
because it is very unlikely that the commercial value of an
invention, exclusive to the U.S. market, will justify the high cost
of an interference proceeding and the record-keeping necessary to
establish priority.2 35 Although it is too soon to decide the impact
of the exception, lack of additional provisional right protection
strongly discourages domestic applicants from taking advantage
of the exception of early publication."6
This proposal will also make it possible for the USPTO to
collaborate with patent offices of first-to-file countries and reduce
its examination burden. Currently, the USPTO is engaging in
negotiations to persuade first-to-file countries to adopt a one-year
grace period with conditions as generous as the conditions under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b).237 Through the negotiation, the United States
234. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
235. Mossinghoff, supra note 142, at 428 (noting the high cost of filing an
interference proceeding).
236. About 10% of applicants who are eligible to opt out of eighteen-month
publication elect the option. E-mail from Stephen Kunin, Deputy Comm'r for Patent
Examination Policy, USPTO, to Toshiko Takenaka, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Washington School of Law (July 3, 2002, 18:48:26 EST) (on file with author).
237. Draft Patent Treaty, supra note 209, art. 9, alt. B. For a general discussion of
the treaty drafting process, see Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Mere
Compromise?: A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a
Proposal for a "First-to-Invent" Exception for Domestic Applicants (Sept. 16, 2002)
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aims to facilitate mutual recognition of examination results
among participating patent offices. 238 Allowing applicants that
file only in the United States to use the first-to-invent system
will have no effect on this goal. Moreover, an adoption of the U.S.
grace period by countries of major markets for U.S. industry will
help small inventors and universities.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the current first-to-invent novelty and priority
provisions in § 102 has revealed serious problems resulting from
a complex structure to define the prior art and inclusion of
confusing terms without definition. A review of the examination
and interference practice at the USPTO also has revealed that a
serious discrepancy between the language of the current novelty
and priority provisions very likely misleads U.S. inventors. The
well-established perception of first-to-invent favoring small
inventors does not reflect the USPTO practice. It is necessary to
revise § 102 to make the novelty and priority rules simple and
user-friendly. Rewriting § 102 to reflect current USPTO practice
results in a revised statute that inevitably looks more like first-
to-file system novelty and priority provisions, with the exceptions
of grace period and first-to-file priority. The language makes
clear the first-to-file system protects inventors from losing their
rights by delaying application filing. Further, eliminating secret
prior art greatly improves the certainty in U.S. patent validity.
However, the complexity of determining the priority under
the first-to-invent rule and the cost of administrating expensive
interference proceedings will remain as long as the U.S. patent
system maintains the first-to-invent exception. To further
simplify the priority rule, the exception for establishing the
priority should be limited. Although elimination of the first-to-
invent exception and adoption of the first-to-file would simplify
the rule and completely eliminate USPTO administration costs,
such a drastic change would attract objections from those who
have been misled by the well-established perception and may not
be realistic. The more modest proposals of limiting the priority
dispute to within the one-year grace period and limiting the
exception to domestic applicants who do not wish to apply outside
the United States are more realistic but still greatly reduce the
scope of the first-to-invent exception. The proposals also move the
(unpublished manuscript, on file with HARV. J.L. & TECH.).
238. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., STANDING COMM. ON PATENTS, Report, at 4 WIPO
Doc. No. SCP/4/6 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/
session_4/doc/scp4_6.doc (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
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U.S. patent system more in line with systems of first-to-file
countries, and the proposals make it possible for the USPTO to
share with other patent offices the administrative burden of
examining applications, thereby reducing the cost and time for
patent procurement.

